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Abstract 
The main problem of public agricultural development banks is their lack of viability, 
mostly reflected by the decline in the real value of their loanable funds, as a consequence 
of inflation, poor loan collection, and operational losses. As a result, these banks have lost 
support from their clientele, international donors, and governments. The conceptual 
framework for traditional agricultural credit programs is contrasted with the new Ohio State 
University view on rural financial markets. Viability requires reaching larger numbers of 
customers with a wider range of financial services, including deposit facilities; increasing the 
volume of purchasing power transferred from surplus to deficit units through market-
oriented intermediation; improving the quality of the services provided and guaranteeing 
permanent access to the services of these institutions; and lowering transaction costs for all 
market participants. Viability requires environment and policy changes, institutional 
strengthening, and technological innovation. 
ON THE VIABILI1Y OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS: 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK1 
by 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega2 
I. Introduction 
During the past decade, the preoccupation among bankers, representatives of inter-
national agencies, and the financial authorities of the developing countries, as well as among 
professionals concerned with economic development, regarding the performance of the 
agricultural development banks, has been increasing.3 
These banks were created several decades ago, with the objective of supplying, either 
the longer-term credit that the commercial banks were not prepared to grant, or the loans 
demanded by specific clientele, such as medium and small farmers, who lacked adequate 
1 This paper was prepared for the Office of External Review and Evaluation (ORE) of 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), as background material for the Study of the 
IDB's Experience with Institutional Strengthening Assistance, under the direction of 
Francisco Guzman. The author is solely responsible for the views expressed here. These 
views may or may not be shared by the sponsoring institution. 
2 Professor of Agricultural Economics and of Economics at the Ohio State University. 
Previously, Dean of the Faculty of Economic Sciences at the University of Costa Rica. The 
author thanks comments by Douglas H. Graham and Francisco Guzman. 
3 An earlier concern with the performance of the public agricultural development banks 
was strongly voiced by the Rural Financial Markets Program at the Ohio State University. 
These preoccupations were summarized by Compton Bourne and Douglas H. Graham in 
"Problems with Specialized Agricultural Lenders," in Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, 
and J. D. Von Pischke, eds. Underminin~ Rural Develcwment with Cheap Credit, Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 
1 
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access to the financial services of the traditional banking sector, but who were considered 
to be a priority by the governments of the developing nations. These target clientele have 
been among the riskiest and costliest to supply with financial services. 
Publicly-owned, most of the time, the agricultural development banks have received 
the largest share of their funds from international agencies, governments, or central banks, 
and have granted credit, to the extent allowed by the availability of these public-sector-
determined funds, to beneficiaries who have not always possessed the requirements of cred-
itworthiness, frequently at subsidized interest rates. 
As claimed in the 1989 World Deyelo.prnent Re.port, "in practice, the development 
finance institutions found it difficult to finance projects with high economic but low financial 
rate~ of return and remain financially viable at the same time ... Today many of them are 
insolvent. H they are to remain in operation, they will have to be restructured.'14 The need 
for institutional transformation, in order to achieve their viability, is particularly urgent in 
the case of the public agricultural development banks. 
II Lack of Viability 
The main problem of the public agricultural development banks has been their lack 
of viability. A viable financial institution is self-sustaining and valued by its clientele. This 
requires an agency that is able to cover its costs, that provides high quality services, that 
reaches an increasing number of customers, that is dynamic in providing new financial 
4 World Bank, World Develcwment Re.port 1989, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989, p. 106. 
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services and products, and that actively searches for ways of improving its efficiency, as 
reflected by the level and the degree of dispersion of the transaction costs incurred by its 
depositors, its borrowers, and the intermediary itself. Viable institutions possess credibility 
and are able to mobilize deposits from the public, to collect their loans, and to retain good 
management and staff.5 
Their lack of viability has been reflected by a steady reduction of the relative im-
portance of the public agricultural development banks within the financial sector of the 
developing countries. This, in turn, has threatened the survival of these banks, since the less 
important an institution is, the easier it becomes to scrap it. This decline in their relative 
importance has occured because most agricultural development banks have not been able 
to increase and, in many instances, even to sustain the flow of their loanable funds, in real 
terms. On the contrary, their lending capacity has sharply decreased. 
The lending capacity of the agricultural development banks has declined, in turn, 
because they have not protected their portfolios from inflation, because they have not 
vigorously collected their loans, in order to be able to grant new credit, because they have 
not aggressively mobilized local resources, in order to be able to widen the range of their 
services, and because, in view of the poor quality of their services and the high transaction 
costs that they impose, they have lost the support of their clientele. Moreover, as their 
institutional weaknesses have become increasingly evident, they have lost the support of the 
international agencies, as well, and, as a result, their loanable funds have substantially 
5 See Richard L Meyer, ''The Viability of Rural Financial Institutions and the System 
as a Whole," Report of the Fourth Technical Consultation on the Scheme of 
Airicultural Credit Develcwment, Rome: FAO, 1988, pp. 41-44. 
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declined. Ironically, their lack of viability has been, in large part, a consequence of their 
strong dependency on outside funds, from international donors, central banks, and 
governments. 
Given their strong financial dependency and the absence of a mobilization of deposits 
from the public, there has been a growing political intrusion in the agricultural development 
banks, in the sense that the decisions about who to lend to, what to lend for, and in what 
terms and conditions to lend have not been autonomously taken by the financial intermedi-
ary, but have been imposed from the outside by the external sources of funds. The criteria 
used by these other agencies have not necessarily been compatible with the institution's 
viability. 
Lacking viability, the survival of the public agricultural development banks has been 
questioned by many, including their own clientele. Increasing levels of loan default have 
evidenced this loss of the support of their customers. Loan delinquency has been a signal 
that the borrowers have not been interested in the survival of the institution. Since they 
have not expected the institution to be able to provide a permanent service, the value of 
their relationship with the bank has been low, and they have not taken care to protect it 
with the timely service of their loan obligations. 
Where the public agricultural development banks have not mobilized voluntary de-
posits from the local community, they have lost the potential support from a mass of 
depositors. When these have been available, the quality of the services provided to their 
depositors has determined the extent of their support and, therefore, the bank's ability to 
grow on the basis of locally mobilized resources. A greater reliance on deposit mobilization 
• 
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has been critical at a time when severe fiscal constraints have reduced the ability of 
governments to capitalize these institutions with budgetary transfers, when the targets of 
macroeconomic stabilization programs have eliminated their access to central bank 
rediscounting, and when the international debt crisis has reduced these banks' access to 
foreign savings. 
The public agricultural development banks have also lost much of the support of the 
international organizations. These agencies have been increasingly subject to the evaluation 
of taxpayers and the scrutiny of politicians, most prominently from the United States 
Congress. The success of the activities promoted by these agencies has been a major 
criterion in the evaluation of their effectiveness, given an increasing competition among 
potential users of available funds. The poor performance of the public agricultural develop-
ment banks has thus jeopardized the reputation of the international agencies that work with 
them and has led to the withdrawal of their support. 
The public agricultural development banks have retained, however, the support of 
some local politicians, who still see them as mechanisms to favor some groups of society at 
the expense of others; that is, as instruments for political patronage. The lack of viability 
of the public agricultural development banks has mostly reflected, precisely, these high 
levels of political intrusion and the biasing of their objectives away from efficient financial 
intermediation and towards other political goals. 
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III. Traditional Conceptual Framework 
In order to better understand the deficiencies of the public agricultural development 
banks, it is useful to consider the conceptual framework that originated the traditional 
agricultural credit programs. In the first place, the design of the agricultural development 
banks did not seek as its objective the financial viability of these institutions. The present 
difficulties should not be surprising, therefore. 
In particular, the management autonomy of these institutions was seen as less 
important than other non-financial objectives to be pursued. These banks were expected 
to promote the growth of agricultural production, regional development, the adoption of new 
technology and/or agrarian reform. No one was much concerned about their institutional 
viability: the available funds were apparently abundant. If these resources were lost, they 
could be easily replenished. This was the model of the development bank as a top-bottom 
conduit for outside funds; it was expected to be "succesful" as long as the external resources 
lasted. 
The sound growth and the strength of the financial institution ~ ~ were not a 
priority. What was designed was an instrument to promote other development objectives, 
even if these purposes created excessive costs and risks for the institution. Burdened by 
their efforts to reach multiple and frequently inconsistent goals, these banks have been 
subjected to outside pressures that have weakened their institutional viability. 
In order to survive, the agricultural development banks must now emphasize their 
role as financial intermediaries. They must operate under the assumption that the efficient 
provision of financial services ~ ~ is already an important contribution to economic 
• 
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development. Instead of attempting to promote the production of particular crops or the 
adoption of specific technological practices, they must recognize that the role of financial 
intermediation is precisely to improve efficiency via the reallocation of resources through 
the discipline of the market mechanism. For this reason, what matters most is to strengthen 
the process of financial intermediation itself. 
Second, the design of the traditional agricultural credit programs was characterized 
by borrower domination. All practices and operational procedures were designed with the 
interest of the borrowers in mind; not for the sake of depositors or of the institutions. Thus, 
the rapid disbursement of the funds was favored. Target clientele were chosen independent-
ly of their repayment capacity or without any guarantee of recuperation of the funds. Credit 
was subsidized. 
In a depositor-dominated institution, on the other hand, the practices and procedures 
utilized seek to protect the depositors' savings. In this case, the borrowers' repayment 
capacity is taken more seriously. In this case, the procedures for and efforts towards loan 
collection are emphasized more than the quick disbursement of the funds. In this case, 
portfolio diversification is used as a tool to manage risk, instead of concentrating the 
portfolio in a few crops or activity types. 
Borrower-dominated institutions have been characterized by the absence of a clear 
concept of risk in their operations. They have attempted, instead, to channel funds to target 
clientele, for specific purposes, rather than evaluating the borrower's repayment capacity and 
the degree of risk taken in each case. Within a depositor-dominated intermediary, on the 
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other hand, a careful management of risk is the most important component of the 
organization's culture. 
Third, traditional credit programs have mistrusted the market and have minimized 
the role of interest rates as a major tool for resource allocation. These programs have 
preferred, instead, the administrative determination of who to lend to and what to lend for. 
Because of their dependency on external funds, these decisions have been, in tum, frequent-
ly imposed from outside. Price (interest rate) controls have been particularly ineffective, 
however, in financial markets. Savers have avoided bank deposits when the rates of interest 
paid have been repressed and as a result the market share of formal financial institutions 
has declined. Informal, non-regulated, parallel markets have flourished instead. 
Supervised credit programs have not trusted farmers, either. Instead, they have in-
sisted on rigidly targeting credit and on a detailed supervision of the use of the funds. 
These efforts, despite their good intentions, have resulted in unexpected negative conse-
quences. On the one hand, the fungibility of the funds has frustrated attempts to control 
their end uses. Loans have transfered generalized purchasing power which, combined with 
the borrower's own resources, has made it possible to finance multiple activities and, 
thereby, impossible to control the marginal use of the loan funds. Rationing, on the other 
hand, needed in view of the excess demand created by underpriced credit, as well as an ex-
cessive supervision, have both increased transaction costs, for the bank and for the 
borrowers. These implicit costs have been especially high in the case of small loans. Rigid 
credit programing, although usually fruitless, has thus been expensive for all market 
participants and specially for marginal customers. 
• 
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Fourth, agricultural development banks have been pessimistic about the opportunities 
for a successful mobilization of local deposits. They have assumed, instead, that rural 
economic agents do not save, that they do not want to transform some of their assets into 
bank deposits, and that they do not react to changes in interest rates and in other economic 
incentives. Those few institutions that have emphasized savings mobilization have been 
more successful than those agencies that have ignored this dimension of financial 
intermediation. The former have actually discovered that there is a high demand for deposit 
facilities in the rural areas of the developing countries and have successfully tapped these 
additional loanable funds. 
In the absence of deposit mobilization, agricultural development banks have been 
truncated, incomplete, and vulnerable institutions. They have been merely a conduit for the 
easy disbursement of the funds from external agencies. These funds have gone through the 
bank, from top to bottom, but have not strengthened it. When disbursement has been 
quick, it has been a reason for celebration. Loan recuperation, on the other hand, has been 
less appealing. The borrower knows this and has not been very concerned with timely 
repayment. The institutional connection with the client has thus been weak and his loyalty 
has been limited. 
Delinquency has been the main signal that the borrowers have not been interested 
in the institution's survival. Instead, they have taken the loans while the funds have been 
available, particularly when credit has been subsidized, but have not been concerned about 
the institution's future. They will not bet on the institution's survival. In due time, default 
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has weakened the institution and has confirmed the client's pessimistic self~fulfilling 
prediction. The bank has then been caught in a vicious circle. 
Timely repayment of the loans is, on the other hand, a recognition of the value fe.r 
the client of his relationship with the financial intermediary. The most powerful incentive 
for the borrower's repayment is the expectation of a reliable and contlnuod accesa to 
valuable financial services. Few public agricultural development banks have been able to 
provide this. 
The depositor is thus the financial institution's best ally. His concern for the safety 
Qf bis depo~t also contributes to the protection of the intermediary's interests. The key i~. 
however, to make deposit mobilization voluntary. The client must view depo$it facilities as 
& valuable service and not as an imposition or as a mere tool to increase tho effective cost 
of the loans. If savings are forced, instead of being grateful for the service, the client resents 
the imposition and withdraws the accumulated funds as soon as he can (directly or through 
a loan.) and loses interest in his savings account, which then shows no activity. What 
matter~. therefore, is the quality of service to the client. Quality promotes client support, 
t11e healthiest way for an intermediary to grow. 
IV, 'Jb@ New Yiew on Finance and Development 
The point of departure of a modern analysis of the role of the public agricultural 
development banks is the recognition that the performance of financial markets matters. 
The efficient provision of financial services: 
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(a) increases the productivity of available resources; that is, improves efficiency in 
resource allocation; 
(b) increases the flow of savings and investment, thus contributing to faster economic 
growth; 
(c) favors stability, through greater market integration and opportunities for risk 
management; and 
( d) can improve income distribution, by making available to those with few resources 
of their own, purchasing power with which to take advantage of their productive 
opportunities, which otherwise would have to be forgone. 
All of this does not happen automatically. There are successful financial systems and 
there are poorly performing financial systems. There are viable financial intermediaries and 
there are insolvent financial institutions. In recent times, several developments have 
threatened efficient financial intermediation. 
Most alarming has been inflation, a result in most countries of too rapid a nominal 
expansion of domestic credit and, as a consequence, of money supply compared to the 
demand for the money. The accelerating growth of domestic credit has mostly reflected, in 
turn, the financing of public-sector budget deficits. Frequently, the excessive growth of 
domestic credit has also reflected substantial quasi-fiscal transfers to the private sector and 
a multiplicity of subsidies, including underpriced credit. By directly levying a tax on the 
public's holdings of the liabilities of the financial system, inflation has been this sector's 
worst foe. When it has accelerated, it has quickly destroyed the financial system of many 
developing countries. Both inflation and the demand for the foreign exchange needed to 
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service the country's external debt have, in tum, exerted upward pressure on the exchange 
rat<!. The resulting devaluation expectations have jeopardized the performance of the 
domestic financial system as well. While all formal financial institutions have been hurt by 
these developments, the agricultural development banks have been particularly slow in 
adjusting to the new environment. 
A new approach for the analysis and promotion of rural financial markets has been 
developed, mostly by researchers at The Ohio State University.6 A global view, that seeks 
to understand the performance of the whole financial system, has replaced the partial views 
of the past. The new approach has adopted a general-equilibrium perspective, a systems 
approach, and it has abandoned the partial vision and incomplete actions of earlier decades. 
Interest has moved away from the design and implementation of specific credit pro-
jects and programs, specialized and isolated, towards a concern with the efficiency and 
integration of financial markets. The new approach has recognized that the purpose of fi-
nancial policy must be the creation of markets, when these are absent or are incomplete; 
the improvement of market performance, when this is not efficient; and the use of the 
power of financial services to integrate other non-financial markets. Following Shaw, the 
new view has claimed that the contributions of finance to development result precisely from 
its capacity to integrate markets across the economy.7 
6 See Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, ''The Ohio State University's Approach to Rural Financial 
Markets: A Concepts Paper," Columbus: Rural Financial Markets Program, Ohio State 
University, 1986. 
7 Edward S. Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic Development~ New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1974. 
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The needs for credit and the supply of loans had been traditionally emphasized. This 
had reflected the domination of financial institutions by the interest of the borrowers. The 
new view has emphasized, instead, the importance of efficiently supplying the whole range 
of financial services. It has highlighted, in particular, the existence of a strong demand for 
better deposit facilities. This emphasis has recognized that all economic agents face costly 
liquidity management requirements. Moreover, it has considered local deposit mobilization 
as a powerful tool to increase the viability of financial institutions, a dimension ignored by 
many public agricultural development banks. 
All the emphasis had been placed in the past on interest rates: they must be low, 
claimed some; they must be high, answered others. The new view has insisted that tran-
saction costs are important, as well, and must not be ignored. Moreover, while interest rates 
can be set by decree, transaction costs can only be reduced through competition, innovation, 
and efficiency. 
The traditional view had emphasized the search for an ideal type of financial institu-
tion. This led to the creation of specialized institutions that enjoyed little success. The new 
view has predicted that different institutional types possess comparative advantages to reach 
different clientele and to provide diverse classes of financial services. What matters, 
therefore, is the performance of the whole system, where numerous and diverse market 
participants are linked through flows of funds and of information. Thus, economic agents 
who borrow in one market segment, lend in another and thereby reduce overall transaction 
costs. 
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What matters is market integration and the identification of an optimum division of 
labor among various institutional types, banks and credit unions, public institutions and 
private agents. For this, the policies that guide their behavior are more important than 
differences in institutional type. Incorrect policies send wrong signals to all kinds of 
intermediaries, independently of their organizational structure. This is why a regulatory 
environment that promotes, rather than represses, competition is critical. Institutional 
incentives and behavior matter, as well, and a correct organizational structure will in part 
determine if there is a role for public agricultural development banks within this optimum 
division of labor among financial institutions. 
The traditional view had promoted supervised credit: loans targeted towards specific 
sectors by reserve requirements and rediscounting programs; channelled to target clientele 
by the requirements of international agencies; and directed towards special input uses by 
loan supervision. What matters, however, is the creation of creditworthiness; the existence 
of economic agents able to borrow, to pay market interest rates, to efficiently use funds, and 
pay loans back. Timely, untied, flexible loans would allow these creditworthy agents to 
improve their global financial management and would increase their productivity. 
What matter, therefore, are financial intermediaries capable of identifying credit-
worthy agents at a low cost and of servicing their varied demands for financial services as 
well as of timely collecting those loans. Supervised credit is a costly and fruitless way to 
create creditworthiness. The fungibility of credit makes it impossible to control the marginal 
use of the funds. Given this fungibility, borrowers can easily substitute the money from the 
loan for their own funds (marginal substitution) or channel them to non-authorized uses 
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(diversion). Additionality is thus limited. Efforts to target credit, on the other hand, have 
been a major source of transaction costs for the lender as well as for the borrower. 
Targeting has not only been fruitless; it has been costly as well. 
In summary, what is needed are viable institutions, capable of offering a wide range 
of financial services, to an ample clientele, independently of the end use of the funds. If the 
interest rates charged are not subsidized, the borrowers will devote the funds to priority 
uses. They know better than anyone else how to efficiently use those funds. If the loans 
are expensive, they will economize them. 
V. Financial Efficiency and Development Bank Viability 
The viability of the agricultural development banks requires self-sufficiency. The 
bank must be able to operate mostly on the basis of its "own" funds (mobilized deposits) and 
to make independent lending decisions. Several performance dimensions characterize a 
viable financial intermediary. 
First, the viability of an agricultural development bank will increase to the extent to 
which it provides access to a wide range of financial services for wide segments of the 
population. This contribution rests on the provision of a growing range of services, including 
both loans for different purposes as well as deposit facilities, mechanisms for the transfer 
of funds, and currency exchanges, as well as other specialized services, once market size has 
grown sufficiently. 
In particular, it has been shown that there is a high demand for deposit facilities in 
the rural areas of the developing countries, given requirements for liquidity management 
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and reserve accumulation. While not all producers need credit, all of the time, practically 
all economic units demand liquidity management facilities, such as deposit opportunities, 
all of the time. Moreover, a depositor does not need to demonstrate creditworthiness in 
order to open a savings account, while he is who decides when and for how much to deposit 
or withdraw. The customer is in control of the situation. The bank, in tum, will take into 
account the client's performance as a depositor when the loan application eventually arrives. 
Deposits represent, therefore, the easiest way to initiate a banking relationship. 
Access to financial services is costly and difficult to supply, however. On the occasion 
of studies undertaken in over 100 countries for AID's Spring Review of Small Farmer 
Credit, it was estimated in 1974 that only 15 percent of the agricultural producers of Latin 
America had access to institutional sources of credit.8 There might have been some 
progress since then, but not much. The mere creation of the public agricultural develop-
ment banks has not been sufficient to significantly increase access. 
Second, the viability of an agricultural development bank is strengthened to the ex-
tent to which it transfers growing volumes of purchasing power, from depositors with limited 
investment opportunities, to borrowers with better productive options. The contribution of 
financial intermediation to economic development precisely consists of the transfer of 
resources, from less productive uses, to activities where they can be more profitably 
employed. In this way, deposits substitute for less attractive uses of the funds, while loans 
make better uses possible. The productivity of resources is thereby improved. 
8 See Gordon Donald, Credit for Small Farmers in Developing Countries, Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1976. 
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The extent to which intermediation increases efficiency and, therefore, the viability 
of the agricultural development bank both depend on the amounts of purchasing power so 
transferred. What matters is the real value of the channelled funds; their command over 
resources. What matters is not how many million pesos of credit are granted, but how much 
seed, fertilizer, or heads of livestock can be purchased with the loan. 
The creation and conservation of purchasing power has both macroeconomic re-
quirements and intermediary-level implications. At the macroeconomic level, to create 
pesos is easy; they can be issued (printed) at the central bank. To create nominal credit is 
easy, as well. To create purchasing power, on the contrary, is very difficult. This requires 
that economic agents be capable and willing to save. In addition, they must be willing to 
place their savings in a financial institution. Thus, the purchasing power channelled through 
the financial system will increase only if income grows and only if economic agents find 
incentives and opportunities to save and to deposit. To be able to attract the depositor is 
thus indispensable for the transfer of purchasing power from surplus to deficit units. This 
poses a potential conflict, to the extent to which interest rates attractive for the depositors 
may increase the cost of funds for the borrowers. 
Inflation erodes the purchasing power of deposits and the purchasing power of loan 
portfolios. To avoid this erosion, depositors transfer their purchasing power to other assets 
that are better forms of holding wealth in an inflationary economy, because they conserve 
value: real estate, inventories, precious metals. Similarly, to avoid the threat to their 
purchasing power from devaluation, depositors transfer it abroad; they buy foreign curren-
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cies (dollars) or open bank accounts in Miami. The consequence is a reduction of the real 
value of the deposits held in the domestic financial system. 
The main responsibility of a financial intermediary is, in turn, to keep the integrity 
of its loanable funds. The intermediary keeps those funds in custody, in the name of de-
positors (or international agencies) that entrusted those funds, so they could, in turn, 
facilitate the borrowers' productive activities. If the intermediary does not protect those 
funds, it breaks its agreement with the depositors, who expect to recuperate the wealth they 
have made available to others. If this purchasing power is not protected, the intermediary 
will find it impossible to offer loan services to its borrowers, when these need its support. 
To keep the integrity of its loanable funds, the intermediary must avoid their erosion 
by inflation. This will only be possible if the rates of interest charged are positive in real 
terms; that is, if they are higher than the inflation rate. Since depositors look for protection 
from inflation, as well, the intermediary must pay a positive real rate of interest for the 
savings mobilized. The institution's interest rate policies must respond, therefore, to 
expected inflation rates. 
An intermediary that charges only 50 percent of nominal interest on its loans, with 
an inflation rate of 100 percent per year will experience, on this account only, a reduction 
of the purchasing power of its portfolio to two-fifths in only three years. Thus, it will be in 
a position to offer the same credit service to only 40 percent of its original clientele. If it 
tried to service all of these clients, it could offer no more than 40 percent of the purchasing 
power originally transferred. One way or another, the quality of the service would have 
deteriorated and the institution would lose the support of both its depositors and borrowers. 
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Inflation forces the financial institution to revise its procedures. Accounting practices 
must be modified, in order to reflect the real value of assets and liabilities and to avoid 
decapitalization. The greater variability of prices that usually accompanies an inflationary 
process, frequently coupled with selective price controls, makes the evaluation of lending 
risks even more difficult. Portfolio management practices have to be revised. 
In order to keep the integrity of its loanable funds, the institution must also 
collect its loans. An intermediary that each year loses 20 percent of its portfolio because 
of default will be decapitalized the same as with an equivalent rate of inflation. Moreover, 
delinquency generates a negative demonstration effect. If others do not pay, and get away 
with it, why should I pay? 
In order to keep the integrity of its loanable funds, an institution must avoid opera-
tional losses as well. This implies both a reduction of operation costs, avoiding waste and 
inefficiency, as well as sufficient revenues. Effectively earned interest is the main source of 
revenues for a financial intermediary. The rate of interest charged on the loans must cover 
expected inflation and the institution's operating costs, at the same time that it makes it 
possible to build sufficient reserves against default losses and it offers an attractive remuner-
ation to the depositors. To achieve this balance is not an easy task. 
Third, an agricultural development bank will be viable to the extent to which it offers 
high-quality financial services. A farmer is interested not only in sufficient purchasing power 
from the loan; he also wants the funds to be timely disbursed, the loan procedure to be easy 
and flexible, the amortization schedule to adequately correspond to his cash flow, and the 
loan term to be sufficiently long. All of these features determine the quality of service. The 
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farmer wants, in particular, access to a financial institution that offers timely, reliable, 
encompassing, and permanent services. 
It is not always easy to establish creditworthiness. For this purpose what is most 
important is for the lender to acquire enough information about the borrower, in order to 
be able to estimate the probability of lack of repayment. This information is accumulated 
through experience and a continued relationship with a particular client. Once his reputa-
tion as a good borrower has been established, the client protects it, since it is a valuable 
intangible asset. This asset is more valuable if the credit program is permanent rather than 
transitory. 
The borrower also expects the program to be reliable; the expected losses from lack 
of access to credit when this is needed, such as during an emergency, can be high. Untimely 
service may also cause additional costs for the producer. The more complete the service, 
such as in a "financial supermarket," the greater the convenience and the less the cost for 
the client. There are many advantages for the client from both holding his deposits and 
conducting his credit transactions at the same institution. 
The public agricultural development banks have not offered high quality services. 
Because of targeting and loan supervision, their credit services have been narrow and many 
financial needs have been left unmet. Frequently, these banks have not offered depositing 
facilities. Given their dependency on outside funds, their credit programs have not been 
permanent and reliable. Rather, their funds have expanded and contracted with the ebb of 
flows of foreign assistance. Given the excess demand for credit that results from subsidized 
loans, long delays in disbursement and less than sufficient loan amounts have become 
• 
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frequent rationing devices. Many of their clients have been forced to search for complemen-
tary services elsewhere, further increasing their costs. 
The client's first interest, therefore, is a solid and viable institution with which to 
develop a long-term financial relationship. This is, indeed, the nature of his implicit con-
tract with the informal moneylender. The farmer is not interested, for these reasons, in 
policies that reduce the quality of the services offered. Of course, if money is being given 
away, he will not refuse it, but most likely he will value the institution less. A bank that is 
not valued by its customers is not viable. 
Fourth, the viability of an agricultural development bank is strengthened if it offers 
low-cost services. This does not mean that interest rates must be kept at artificially low 
levels. What is the value of too low an interest rate, if the loans are disbursed several 
months later, when they are not needed any longer, or if the bank does not authorize the 
expenditures that the farmer wants? What is the value of an artificially low interest rate, 
if it decapitalizes the bank to the point that it has to drastically reduce the amounts that it 
can lend? What is the value of subsidized credit, if the farmer can get it this year but not 
the next? 
It becomes necessary to recognize that, in order to be able to offer high quality 
services, development banks need adequate operation margins. It is necessary to recognize, 
as well, that poor quality services impose additional costs on the farmer, that make credit 
even more expensive. Delayed loans reduce the profitability of his productive activities. 
Cumbersome procedures waste his time and effort. Bankers who do not know the activities 
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being financed cannot be useful to their clientele. What seems cheap turns out to be 
expensive. 
Financial services are not cheap. The operation of the financial system is costly both 
for the intermediaries and their clientele. What matters, for production and investment 
decisions, is the total cost of the funds for the borrowers. Interest payments are only a 
portion of these costs, frequently not the most important. There are other implicit costs, 
such as the opportunity cost of the time spent in the transaction or the losses due to delays 
in the disbursement of the funds. There are legal expenses, commissions, accounting 
statements, feasibility studies, taxes, travel costs, and bribes. There are risks of law suits and 
losses of collateral, if things do not go well. When these other costs are high, loans are 
expensive. These costs beyond interest payments tend to be particularly high in the case of 
small transactions. 
What matters for the behavior of savers is the net return on deposits, once taxes, 
travel expenses, and the cost of standing in line at a bank branch are subtracted from in-
terest earned. A small depositor from a distant place, who earns 6 pesos a year on his 
passbook account's balance of 100 pesos, cannot even pay for the bus fares for the trip to 
withdraw his interest earnings. He will be forced, in this case, to accumulate wealth in other 
forms, perhaps domestic animals. 
What matters for the intermediary is a financial margin that covers the costs of funds 
mobilization and the costs and risks of lending and that leaves a profit that allows growth. 
A public or private financial intermediary that is not profitable, stagnates, and if it makes 
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losses, it shrinks and it disappears. This can happen to any institution that is not worried 
about its profitability. It has been the case of numerous public development banks. 
The main indicator of financial progress is a reduction in the transaction costs in-
curred by all, actual and potential, market participants. A reduction in these costs that, 
among other things, allows a shrinking of financial margins, is the most effective way to 
simultaneously favor both borrowers and depositors. If the intermediary operates with 
smaller margins, it will be in a position to offer a more attractive rate of interest to deposi-
tors, while at the same time it charges less to its borrowers. The ultimate challenge is this 
greater efficiency, that reduces the potential conflict between borrowers and depositors. 
Intermediation margins are too wide when there is not a vigorous loan collection 
efforts, since this forces the financial institution to accumulate reserves in order to avoid de-
capitalization. In addition to a greater operational efficiency, in order to reduce the cost 
of credit and reward depositors better, a reduction of delinquency is also necessary. 
The lower are interest rates artificially set, on the other hand, the lesser the degree 
of access and the greater the number of farmers excluded from formal credit portfolios. 
The choice is inevitable: either cheaper credit but for less, or non-subsidized credit for a 
larger number and in greater amounts for each one. It is not possible to have more, without 
paying more. 
Similarly, the lower are interest rates artificially set, the poorer the quality of services 
provided. Quality has a cost. Finally, the lower are interest rates artificially set, the higher 
the transaction costs incurred both by the client and the intermediary. Under-equilibrium 
interest rates generate an excess demand for credit that requires non-price rationing to clear 
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the market. This rationing increases transaction costs for all market participants. These 
costs are more burdensome and less equitable than interest rates closer to equilibrium 
levels. Cheap credit, in the end, is expensive. 
In summary, the financial system contributes to economic development if, once all 
uses of real resources are taken into account, its operations imply low costs, for its clientele 
and for society as a whole. The operation of the financial system at too high costs implies 
a waste of resources. These resources could be more profitably employed in other activities: 
the farmer cultivating his farm, instead of traveling to the bank in order to find out what 
ever happened to his loan application; the depositor looking after his business, instead of 
waiting in line for hours at a bank branch; the redundant employee of a financial institution 
contributing with his efforts to another productive activity. Simply setting ceilings on 
interest rates cannot eliminate these excessive social costs. 
VI. Towards Viable Amcultural Development Banks 
The task of the agricultural development banks is costly and difficult, but they can 
still play a key role in promoting welfare in the rural areas of the developing countries. The 
special nature of the rural economy explains some of the problems. Potential depositors and 
borrowers are heterogeneous and geographically dispersed, their transactions are small, and 
risks are high. Their activity is highly dependent on exogenous forces. The consequences 
are high transaction costs and high risks, that reduce both the demand and the supply for 
rural financial services. In these circumstances, to become a viable financial intermediary 
is a difficult task. 
1 
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TRANSACTION COSTS 
TOTAL COST OF THE FUNDS 
LOAN RATE OF INTEREST 
DEPOSIT RATE OF INTEREST 
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Potential depositors find that the net return on their deposits is too low and save in 
other forms. Potential borrowers find that the total cost of formal loans is too high and 
seek the informal sources of credit. Development banks discover that the costs of ad-
ministering a multitude of small savings accounts are too high. Development banks also 
discover that the costs and risks of evaluating and administering a multitude of small loans 
are too high. In order to overcome these obstacles, major efforts are required. 
Viable agricultural development banks would require: 
(a) changes in the environment in which they operate, 
(b) changes in the financial policies that regulate their operation, 
(c) changes in their institutional design, and 
( d) improvements in their financial technologies. 
Elements of the environment determine the profitability and risks of agricultural 
activities and, as a result, the profitability and risks of loans to farmers. Modification of the 
environment is important, because the growth potential of a financial intermediary, such as 
an agricultural development bank, depends to a good extent upon the solvency and dynam-
ism of its clientele. Farmers with low and unstable returns cannot become good bank 
clients. Low incomes limit their savings capacity and their ability to transform some of their 
assets into financial deposits. Low incomes reduce their desire to borrow, limit their oppor-
tunities to profitably use loan funds, and diminish their ability and willingness to repay those 
loans. Agricultural development banks will be more viable and successful when farmer re-
turns are high, rural incomes grow, and economic policies do not discriminate against 
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farming. It is important to recognize, nevertheless, that credit, by itself, cannot increase the 
profitability of agriculture. Credit is not a panacea. The solution is elsewhere. 
The development of the country's infrastructure, greater security in land tenure 
arrangements, and a legal framework that protects property rights and the enforcement of 
contracts increase resource productivity and reduce transaction costs and, in this way, 
promote rural financial markets and the viability of agricultural development banks. 
Economic policies that repress rural incomes and increase their variability constrain 
deposit and loan demand and reduce creditworthiness. In addition to the price policies, 
taxes and subsidies that critically influence farmers' incomes, appropriate macroeconomic 
management and financial policies are crucial for the promotion of rural financial markets. 
Cautious macroeconomic management promotes stability and protects financial transactions 
from inflation. Prudential supervision of financial intermediaries promotes, on the other 
hand, their solvency and, thereby, the public's confidence. This trust is indispensable for 
firms and households to channel their savings through the domestic financial system. 
Rigid and inappropriate financial policies have repressed financial market growth and 
reduced the viability of agricultural development banks in many developing countries. 
Combined with inflation and devaluation, interest-rate restrictions have resulted in negative 
net returns for depositors, in real terms, and have promoted dollarization and the contrac-
tion of the regulated financial system. The expansion of the non-regulated system has 
produced, in turn, a greater degree of market fragmentation. Excessively high reserve 
requirements have had the same effect. Interest-rate restrictions have forced intermediaries 
to adopt non-price rationing criteria that have penalized "difficult" clientele, including many 
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farmers. Restrictions of competition m financial markets have reduced the system's 
efficiency. 
In addition to non-repressive policies and a more adequate regulatory environment, 
promotion of rural financial markets requires viable, independent, permanent, and efficient 
institutions. Inconsistent objectives have reduced the viability of agricultural development 
banks. Excessive specialization has increased their portfolio risks. Lack of deposit mobiliza-
tion has made them weaker institutions. A revision of their objectives is indispensable, in 
order to emphasize their mission as financial intermediaries for the rural areas. For this 
purpose, the agricultural development banks possess a comparative advantage based on their 
widespread network of rural branches, their knowledge of the rural areas and of their 
clientele, and the motivation of their staff. Acquisition of these assets requires fixed 
investments that represent formidable barriers to entry for other formal intermediaries. 
Even in the case of the agricultural development banks, there is substantial unutilized excess 
capacity in their network of branches. Given the high costs for other intermediaries of 
supplying these services, agricultural development banks may still play an important role. 
Institutional performance is critically determined by the behavior of managers, em-
ployees, and customers of the agricultural development bank. The incentives that guide the 
actions of these agents are crucial and should be the focus of any efforts of institutional 
strengthening. A structure of incentives that rewards good decisions and defines accountabil-
ity and penalties for bad decisions is required. Furthermore, the intermediary must have 
enough authority to evaluate loan applications with independence and collect loans with 
energy. Political intrusion must be eliminated. Given the importance of information and 
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of a detailed knowledge of the customer's activities in decisions about creditworthiness, the 
decentralization of decision-making is critical, as well. For decentralization to work, 
however, communication channels must be improved. 
Similarly, new financial technologies (tools and procedures) are needed, in order to 
increase access to services, improve the quality of these services, and reduce transaction 
costs. New instruments are indispensable to more efficiently collect, process, and take 
advantage of information for decision-making and to improve risk management. Unless 
transaction costs are significantly reduced for all market participants, it will continue to be 
impossible to provide financial services to a wide rural clientele. Unless new financial 
technologies substantially reduce these costs, it may be impossible to improve the viability 
of the agricultural development banks. 
